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JACK BALKIN’S CONSTITUTIONALISM AND  
THE EXPERT PANEL ON CONSTITUTIONAL  





I    INTRODUCTION 
In January 2012, the Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of 
Indigenous Australians (‘Expert Panel’) delivered its report to the then Prime 
Minister making a number of recommendations to amend the Australian 
Constitution to ‘recognise’ Indigenous Australians.1 Rather than engage in a legal 
critique of the substance of the Expert Panel’s various proposals, this article 
approaches the Expert Panel’s Report and proposals as a whole from the 
perspective of constitutional theory. It argues that the Expert Panel’s Report and 
proposals strongly reflect the constitutional theory of the American constitutional 
theorist Jack Balkin. 
In his book Living Originalism,2  Balkin conceives of the United States 
Constitution functioning not only as ‘basic law’, distributing powers and setting 
up institutions of government, but also as ‘higher law’, embodying values and 
aspirations for the nation, and as ‘our law’, helping to constitute the people of the 
nation as a people.3 The first claim made in this article is that the Expert Panel 
conceives of the functions of the Australian Constitution in much the same way 
as Balkin conceives of the functions of the United States Constitution. The article 
makes a second claim. For Balkin, a constitution successfully functioning as 
basic law gives it procedural legitimacy whilst its success in functioning as 
higher law and our law gives it moral and sociological legitimacy respectively. 
Whilst the Australian Constitution does not really function as higher law or our 
law in Balkin’s sense, the Expert Panel’s adoption of that kind of thinking can be 
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2  Jack M Balkin, Living Originalism (Belknap Press, 2011). 
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seen as a critique of the legitimacy of the Australian Constitution. The Expert 
Panel implicitly suggests that the Australian Constitution can be made more 
legitimate. The article also makes a third claim building upon the first two. It is 
argued that the Expert Panel is engaged in a project of constitutional redemption, 
a concept that features heavily in Living Originalism and which is the principal 
subject of its companion work Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an 
Unjust World.4 
This article begins by setting out the background to the Expert Panel’s Report 
and notes its various proposals for amendments to the Australian Constitution. 
The article then turns to the first main claim. It explains Balkin’s tripartite view 
of constitutional functions and explores how the Expert Panel’s report and 
recommendations appear to be based on a view of the Australian Constitution as 
higher law and as our law. The article then turns to the second main claim, 
explaining how it is difficult to accept that the Australian Constitution functions 
as higher law and our law in Balkin’s sense and showing how the Expert Panel’s 
adoption of that thinking offers a critique of the legitimacy of the Australian 
Constitution. The article then turns to the third main claim and explores how the 
Expert Panel appears to be engaged in a project of constitutional redemption. The 
article concludes with a reference to The Castle and ‘the vibe’ and suggests that it 
is possible that the Australian people may one day look to the Australian 
Constitution as higher law and our law. 
 
II    THE EXPERT PANEL AND ITS PROPOSALS FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
A    The Expert Panel 
In November 2010, the then Australian Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, 
announced that an Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous 
Australians would be appointed to consult with the Australian community about 
options for constitutional amendment to recognise Indigenous people in the 
Australian Constitution.5 The Expert Panel was appointed the following month, 
and its membership of 19 included both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians, academics, community leaders, business figures and politicians from 
various parties. The Expert Panel was jointly chaired by Professor Patrick 
Dodson, a leading Indigenous figure, and Mark Leibler AC, a partner in law firm 
Arnold Bloch Leibler.6 
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The Expert Panel was given broad terms of reference.7 In part, the terms of 
reference provided: 
The Expert Panel will report to the Government on possible options for 
constitutional change to give effect to Indigenous constitutional recognition, 
including advice as to the level of support from Indigenous people and the broader 
community for each option by December 2011 … 
In performing this role, the Expert Panel will have regard to: 
• Key issues raised by the community in relation to Indigenous constitutional 
recognition; 
• The form of constitutional change and approach to a referendum likely to 
obtain widespread support; 
• The implications of any proposed changes to the Constitution; and 
• Advice from constitutional law experts.8 
At its second meeting in early 2011, the Expert Panel agreed on four 
principles to guide its thinking on proposals for constitutional amendment.9 The 
principles were that each proposal must: 
1. contribute to a more unified and reconciled nation; 
2. be of benefit to and accord with the wishes of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples 
3. be capable of being supported by an overwhelming majority of Australians 
from across the political and social spectrums; and 
4. be technically and legally sound.10 
In conducting its national consultation, the Expert Panel released a discussion 
paper, invited written submissions, implemented a media and digital 
communications strategy, held public consultation meetings around the country 
and engaged a professional opinion polling company to conduct opinion polls.11 
The Expert Panel also engaged an external consultant to provide a qualitative 
analysis of key themes and issues raised in the 3500 written submissions that 
were received.12 
 
B    The Expert Panel’s Proposed Amendments 
The Expert Panel recommended five changes to the Australian Constitution.13 
The first of the Expert Panel’s proposals was to delete section 25 of the 
Australian Constitution, which contemplates the possibility that States may 
disenfranchise people of particular races.14 Section 25 provides: 
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For the purposes of the last section, if by the law of any State all persons of any 
race are disqualified from voting at elections for the more numerous House of the 
Parliament of the State, then, in reckoning the number of the people of the State or 
of the Commonwealth, persons of that race resident in that State shall not be 
counted. 
The Expert Panel also recommended deleting the so-called ‘races power’ in 
section 51(xxvi), which gives power to the Commonwealth Parliament to make 
laws with respect to ‘the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to 
make special laws’.15 In its place, the Expert Panel recommended inserting a new 
section 51A, which would provide: 
51A Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
Recognising that the continent and its islands now known as Australia were first 
occupied by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples; 
Acknowledging the continuing relationship of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples with their traditional lands and waters; 
Respecting the continuing cultures, languages and heritage of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples; 
Acknowledging the need to secure the advancement of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples; 
the Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.16 
The Expert Panel also recommended a provision prohibiting racial 
discrimination. That provision, to be numbered section 116A, would read: 
116A Prohibition of racial discrimination 
(1) The Commonwealth, a State or a Territory shall not discriminate on the 
grounds of race, colour or ethnic or national origin. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude the making of laws or measures for the 
purpose of overcoming disadvantage, ameliorating the effects of past 
discrimination, or protecting the cultures, languages or heritage of any 
group.17 
The final proposal recommended by the Expert Panel was a languages 
provision to be numbered section 127A. That section would read: 
127A Recognition of languages 
(1) The national language of the Commonwealth of Australia is English. 
(2) The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages are the original 
Australian languages, a part of our national heritage.18 
                                                
15  Ibid. Before the Constitutional Alteration (Aboriginals) 1967 (Cth) took effect, s 51(xxvi) provided power 
to make laws for ‘the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is 
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16  Expert Panel, above n 1, 153. 
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In its report, the Expert Panel emphasised the ‘interconnected nature of [its] 
package of proposals for constitutional recognition.’19 It would not be sound, the 
Expert Panel said, to proceed with some but not all of its proposals.  
 
III   CLAIM ONE: THE EXPERT PANEL VIEWS  
THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION AS HIGHER LAW  
AND AS OUR LAW 
A    Balkin and Constitutional Functions 
A necessary step in advancing the first claim of this article is to outline 
Balkin’s view of constitutional functions. The central purpose of Balkin’s book 
Living Originalism is to explain and defend a constitutional theory he calls 
‘framework originalism’.20 In the course of doing so, Balkin offers a tripartite 
view of the functions of a constitution.21 He contends that a constitution serves 
three, sometimes overlapping, functions: as basic law, as higher law and as our 
law.  
Balkin says that a constitution functions as basic law in that it establishes a 
framework for governance that distributes powers, rights, duties and 
responsibilities and promotes political stability.22 A constitution also functions as 
basic law in that it is supreme or foundational law that ‘trumps’ other law to the 
contrary.23 There is no real substantive moral content to this function.24 The 
Australian Constitution can be said to function as basic law in Balkin’s sense 
because it does in fact establish the framework for governance in Australia.25  
For Balkin, a constitution can function not only as basic law but also as 
higher law and our law. It is more doubtful that the Australian Constitution can 
be said to function as higher law or as our law, a matter that will be returned to 
below. A constitution is higher law, Balkin says, when it functions as a ‘source of 
inspiration and aspiration’ and as a ‘repository of values and principles’.26 As 
higher law, a constitution ‘trumps’ other law in the sense that it ‘is a source of 
                                                
19  Ibid 226. 
20  Balkin, above n 2, chs 1–2. 
21  In the body of Living Originalism, Balkin appears to contend that all constitutions serve these functions. 
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22  Balkin, above n 2, 59. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid. 
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University of Illinois Law Review 683, 685. 
26  Balkin, above n 2, 60. 
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moral critique of ordinary law’.27 As Balkin writes, ‘The idea of higher law views 
a constitution as a repository of ideals morally superior to ordinary law and 
toward which ordinary law should strive.’28 A constitution as higher law, Balkin 
says, ‘stands above ordinary law, criticizes it, restrains it, and holds it to 
account.’29 In its function as higher law, a constitution is something in whose 
name political and moral claims can be made by social movements to critique the 
status quo and advocate for change. 30  Balkin cites Martin Luther King’s 
metaphorical description of the United States Constitution as a ‘promissory note’ 
as a telling rhetorical example of a social movement appealing to a constitution 
as higher law.31  
The third function of a constitution identified by Balkin is its function as our 
law. A constitution, Balkin writes, is ‘our law when we identify with it and are 
attached to it’.32 It is our law when it serves as ‘constitutive narrative through 
which people imagine themselves as a people’.33 Seeing the constitution as our 
law has the consequence, Balkin argues, of helping ‘us imagine ourselves as part 
of a collective subject persisting over time’34 with ‘shared memories, goals, 
aspirations, values, duties, and ambitions.’35 As our law, a constitution is central 
to national identity and to the ability of a people to see themselves as a 
historically continuing people.36 A constitution allows people of the present 
generation to see themselves as embarked on a common project with those of 
previous and future generations.37 
 
B    The Expert Panel and the Australian Constitution as Higher Law 
1 The Expert Panel’s Justifications for Recognition Generally and the 
Australian Constitution as Higher Law 
The Expert Panel’s thinking appears to be permeated by a view of the 
Australian Constitution as higher law. This is evident not only in the particular 
proposals for constitutional amendment recommended by the Expert Panel, but 
also in the starting point of its thinking. 
The Expert Panel’s adoption of its guiding principles, noted above, reflect its 
view of the Australian Constitution as a vehicle for national values. Of relevance 
here are the first two of the Expert Panel’s guiding principles: that proposals 
must (1) ‘contribute to a more unified and reconciled nation’ and (2) ‘be of 
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benefit to and accord with the wishes of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples’.38 There is nothing in the Expert Panel’s report that explains why these 
principles were chosen. Indeed, the report simply announces that these principles 
were chosen.39 Nevertheless, these principles are both heavily value-laden. Whilst 
there is scope for debate in identifying and articulating what those values are, 
these principles seem to be infused with notions of reconciliation, national unity, 
social justice, self-determination and equality.  
The Expert Panel’s view of the Australian Constitution as a vehicle for 
national values is also evident in its concern that any Indigenous recognition 
referendum should succeed. The Expert Panel wrote that ‘the failure of a 
referendum on recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
would result in confusion about the nation’s values’.40 However, it is not obvious 
that this would be the necessary result of a failed referendum. The Expert Panel 
did not explain its thinking. It is possible that this conclusion might be drawn 
from the fact that public opinion is revealed through the referendum vote. Whilst 
perhaps superficially plausible, this is not a persuasive position to adopt. The 
failure of the 1988 Rights and Freedoms referendum,41 for example, cannot 
sensibly be taken as proof that Australians do not value rights and freedoms. The 
situation is far more complex than that and referenda fail for a variety of 
reasons.42 Surely, the same may well be true of a failed Indigenous recognition 
referendum. 
It seems, especially when reading the Expert Panel’s report as a whole, that 
the Expert Panel believes confusion about the nation’s values would result from 
the fact that Indigenous recognition would be absent from the constitutional text. 
Indeed, the Expert Panel wrote, in another part of its report, that its proposals 
were ‘essential if our Constitution is to reflect the values of contemporary 
Australia’. 43  In other words, the Expert Panel believes that the Australian 
Constitution reflects the nation’s values, or at least that it should or maybe 
following a successful referendum would. This view of the Australian 
Constitution is the only way that the Expert Panel’s comment makes sense. It 
follows that the Expert Panel seems to have begun its work with a view of the 
Australian Constitution as higher law. 
Indeed, it might be argued that the Expert Panel had no choice but to begin its 
work with a view of the Australian Constitution as higher law. Its terms of 
reference tasked the Expert Panel with developing proposals ‘to give effect to 
Indigenous constitutional recognition’. That task seems to frame the Australian 
                                                
38  Expert Panel, above n 1, 4. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid xvii. 
41  Constitution Alteration (Rights and Freedoms) Bill 1988 (Cth). 
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Constitution as a higher law. Although the terms of reference do not define the 
notion of ‘recognition’, the remarks by the then Prime Minister announcing the 
establishment of the Expert Panel seem to frame the matter in higher law terms. 
Julia Gillard said: 
[W]e're here today to make an announcement related to the commitment of the 
Government to acknowledge the special place of our first peoples in the Australian 
[C]onstitution. 
Can I start today by saying now is the right time to take the next step and to 
recognise in the Australian [C]onstitution the first peoples of our nation; now's the 
right time to take that next step to build trust and respect, and we certainly believe 
that constitutional recognition is an important step to building trust and respect, it's 
an important step to building and acknowledging that the first peoples of our 
nation have a unique and special place in our nation. 
As we all know the Australian [C]onstitution is the foundation document of our 
system of government, but currently it fails to recognise Indigenous Australians … 
We came to government also knowing that change was needed on an emotional 
level … The recognition of Indigenous Australians, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples, in the Australian [C]onstitution is another step, the next step in 
that journey.44 
 
2 The Expert Panel’s Proposals and the Australian Constitution as Higher 
Law 
A view of the Australian Constitution as higher law is also reflected in the 
various proposals for constitutional amendment suggested by the Expert Panel. 
This is so in respect of not just the text the Expert Panel proposes to insert but 
also in respect of the text it proposes to delete. 
As noted above, the Expert Panel recommended that section 25 and the races 
power be deleted from the Australian Constitution. The Expert Panel wrote in its 
report of the ‘blemish on our nationhood’ caused by the fact of the existence of 
these provisions in the Australian Constitution.45 It might readily be conceded 
that it is fair to judge these provisions, as the Expert Panel does, as morally 
repugnant on the basis that race-based laws are objectionable.46 But any such 
judgment is not a sufficient basis for saying the mere existence of these 
provisions, even if they are not used, casts a ‘blemish on our nationhood’. After 
all, many of the Commonwealth’s powers would authorise racially 
discriminatory laws and the Expert Panel does not suggest that those powers, by 
                                                
44  Julia Gillard, ‘Joint Press Conference with Minister Macklin and the Attorney-General: Indigenous 
Australians, Referendum on Constitutional Reform’ (Transcript, 8 November 2010) 
<http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/preview.php?did=17469>. 
45  Expert Panel, above n 1, xii. 
46  But note, as the Expert Panel does, that s 25 ‘was designed to penalise, by a reduction of their federal 
representation, those States where Aboriginal people had not been given the right to vote.’: ibid 14. On 
the purpose of s 25, see also Anne Twomey, ‘An Obituary for s 25 of the Constitution’ (2012) 23 Public 
Law Review 125; cf Dylan Lino and Megan Davis, ‘Speaking Ill of the Dead: A Comment on s 25 of the 
Constitution’ (2012) 23 Public Law Review 231. 
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their mere existence, blemish Australia’s nationhood.47 For example, as history 
reveals, the Commonwealth’s power with respect to ‘immigration’48 supported 
laws implementing a White Australia Policy. An additional premise is necessary 
to reach the Expert Panel’s conclusion that section 25 and the races power cast a 
‘blemish on our nationhood’. That premise is that the Australian Constitution is a 
repository of (at least some of) the nation’s values. If that premise holds true, 
then by expressly contemplating racially discriminatory laws the existence of 
those two provisions reveals that Australia does not value racial equality. If that 
premise does not hold true, those provisions are really no different to the various 
other powers that would support racially discriminatory laws: it is what is done 
pursuant to them rather than their existence that would blemish Australia’s 
nationhood. In other words, the Expert Panel’s comment is premised on a view of 
the Australian Constitution having a ‘higher law’ function.  
The very same analysis applies to the Expert Panel’s comment, in reference 
to the races power, that people participating in its public consultation process 
were ‘embarrassed to learn that the Australian Constitution provides a head of 
power that permits the Commonwealth to make laws that discriminate on the 
basis of “race”.’49 The Expert Panel is not saying that there was embarrassment at 
the fact that there exist racially discriminatory laws. Rather, the Expert Panel is 
saying that the fact such laws are expressly permitted by the Australian 
Constitution is a cause for embarrassment. The notion of embarrassment, like 
that of blemish, is significant. Reference to such morally judgmental notions only 
really makes sense if the Australian Constitution is meant to reflect the nation’s 
values and aspirations or, in other words, serves as higher law in Balkin’s sense. 
If the Australian Constitution was not to serve as higher law then the Expert 
Panel would have had little need to give weight in its thinking to the 
embarrassment the mere existence of the races power prompted in some of those 
whom it consulted. 
‘Higher law’ thinking is also evident in respect of the Expert Panel’s 
proposals for new constitutional provisions. Perhaps the clearest example is 
proposed section 127A, which would acknowledge Indigenous languages. 
Indeed, in respect of that provision the Expert Panel expressly states that the 
provision would not have any ‘basic law’ function at all. The Expert Panel wrote 
in its report that section 127A would not give rise to any rights or obligations and 
would have no legal effect whatsoever. 50  The provision must therefore be 
intended to serve some other function or functions. One of those functions 
appears to be a ‘higher law’ function. The Expert Panel described its proposed 
section 127A as providing ‘an important declaratory statement in relation to the 
                                                
47  The Expert Panel does, however, recommend inserting a new provision prohibiting racially 
discriminatory laws. This provision is discussed below.  
48  Australian Constitution s 51(xxvii). 
49  Expert Panel, above n 1, 42.  
50  Ibid 132. The Expert Panel’s pronouncements about the provision having no legal effect are not binding 
and the High Court might find that the provision does indeed have some legal effect.  
416 UNSW Law Journal Volume 37(2) 
importance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages’51 and as ‘giv[ing] 
appropriate recognition to the significance of those languages’.52 By declaring the 
significance and importance of those languages, the provision would add a value 
or principle to the Australian Constitution: respect for Indigenous languages or 
Indigenous cultural identity of which languages are an integral part. A 
constitutional provision without any intended legal effect or purpose would be 
very odd unless it was found in an Australian Constitution that had functions 
beyond simply a ‘basic law’ function. 
The Expert Panel was also explicit that its proposed section 51A would have 
more than just a ‘basic law’ function. They described proposed section 51A as 
consisting of two types of language: preambular language and operative 
language. 53  The preambular language is described by the Expert Panel in  
its Report as ‘introductory and explanatory’54 and intended to ensure that the 
substantive grant of legislative power, in the operative language of the provision, 
is interpreted to permit only beneficial laws and not adversely discriminatory 
laws.55 To this extent, the preambular recitals in section 51A are intended to serve 
a ‘basic law’ function. The Expert Panel’s report also explained, however, that 
the preambular language has the additional, and important, role of serving as a 
‘statement of recognition’ of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.56 This 
second role is not a ‘basic law’ function. This is plain from the concepts referred 
to in the preambular recitals: matters of history, relationships with land and 
water, and culture. Indeed, it is really only the fourth preambular recital – 
‘Acknowledging the need to secure the advancement of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples’ – that could have any possible interpretive value in 
understanding the substantive grant of legislative power in proposed section 51A. 
In other words, it is only the fourth preambular recital that could have a ‘basic 
law’ function (in addition to its ‘higher law’ function).  
Indeed, the Expert Panel explained that having a ‘statement of recognition’ 
embedded in the preamble to a substantive grant of power would avoid the  
need to include a ‘no legal effect’ clause if a ‘statement of recognition’ were  
to be located on its own, which the Expert Panel objected to as it might  
suggest that any statement of recognition was an empty gesture or tokenistic.57 In 
other words, the Expert Panel expressly stated that, in part, the language of 
proposed section 51A is intended to have some sort of non-legal or extra-legal 
function. The four preambular recitals, taken both individually and together,  
serve a ‘higher law’ function. Indeed, the use of the words ‘Recognising’,58  
                                                
51  Ibid. 
52  Ibid 131. 
53  Ibid 133. 
54  Ibid 130. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid 128–32. 
57  Ibid 115. 
58  Ibid 133. 
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‘Acknowledging’ 59  and ‘Respecting’ 60  is telling. The concepts recognition, 
acknowledgment and respect have important moral content, especially given how 
they are used in the preambular recitals. Those recitals are clearly intended as 
repositories of principles that the Expert Panel, following its consultation 
process, believe to be important to the nation. 
Similarly, the Expert Panel explained in its report that its proposed section 
116A prohibiting racial discrimination is intended to serve more than simply a 
‘basic law’ function. The Expert Panel explained in the introduction to its report 
that proposed section 116A was recommended because there is a case for 
‘affirming that racially discriminatory laws and executive actions have no place 
in contemporary Australia.’61 In the body of the report, the Expert Panel wrote 
that, in addition to its legal operation, proposed section 116A would serve as a 
‘clear and unambiguous renunciation of racial discrimination’.62 Moreover, the 
Expert Panel wrote, this function of proposed section 116A ‘is essential if our 
Constitution is to reflect the values of contemporary Australia.’63 So, for the 
Expert Panel, proposed section 116A not only prohibits racial discrimination, but 
also renounces it and affirms that racial discrimination has no place in Australia. 
This is a moral function; it expresses a morally superior ideal. In Balkin’s 
tripartite classification of constitutional functions, it is a ‘higher law’ function.  
 
C The Expert Panel and the Australian Constitution as Our Law 
1 The Expert Panel’s Justifications for Recognition Generally and the 
Australian Constitution as Our Law 
Just as it views the Australian Constitution as higher law, the Expert Panel 
seems to view the Australian Constitution as our law. Indeed, the Expert Panel 
understood its task, partly, in our law terms. 
In its Discussion Paper, released in May 2011, the Expert Panel discussed 
why constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
was important. 64  The Expert Panel wrote that ‘the unique contribution of 
Indigenous Australians to our national life is not reflected in the nation’s 
founding document’65 but it  should be. The Expert Panel wrote that recognition 
would ‘address the gaps in our Constitution … to create a shared vision of the 
kind of Australia we aspire to become.’66 Under the subheading ‘Reflecting who 
we are as a nation’,67 the Expert Panel explained that ‘we have been asked to 
                                                
59  Ibid. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Ibid xiv. 
62  Ibid 168. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Expert Panel, ‘A National Conversation about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Constitutional 
Recognition’ (Discussion Paper, May 2011). 
65  Ibid 5. 
66  Ibid 6. 
67  Ibid 10. 
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respond to the desire of many Australians to see the Constitution changed to 
recognise Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples so that it more truly 
reflects the lives and values of Australians today.’68  Under the subheading 
‘National identity’, 69  the Expert Panel wrote that constitutional recognition 
‘would also be a way of reconciling with our past and collectively moving on.’70  
The Expert Panel wrote in its Discussion Paper that constitutional recognition 
‘could also benefit all Australians by strengthening the sense of belonging by 
people from diverse backgrounds living in Australia today, and affirming the 
values of equality, democracy and fairness that unite us all.’71 In other words, the 
Expert Panel was of the view that constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples would have an our law function. It would have an 
identity function. It would help constitute the Australian people as a united 
people by allowing them to imagine themselves as a united people. It would help 
reflect and constitute Australia’s national identity. As the first of the Expert 
Panel’s guiding principles states, recognition would ‘contribute to a more unified 
and reconciled nation’. Much of this could easily have been written by Balkin; 
after all he writes that in its ‘our law’ function a written constitution helps ‘bind 
people together’.72  
The same sentiments are present in the Expert Panel’s report. The Expert 
Panel wrote in its report of how Australians want to see their ‘sense of 
nationhood and citizenship reflected in the Constitution’.73 Indeed, the Expert 
Panel expressly says that constitutional recognition would directly contribute to 
imagining national identity: 
Most significantly, constitutional recognition would provide a foundation to bring 
the 2.5 per cent [of Australians who are Indigenous] and the 97.5 per cent [of 
Australians who are non-Indigenous] together, in a spirit of equality, recognition 
and respect, and contribute to a truly reconciled nation for the benefit of all 
Australians.74 
The Expert Panel also wrote that should a recognition referendum fail there 
would be confusion not just about the nation’s values, as mentioned above, but 
also the nation’s ‘sense of national identity.’75 Indeed, the Expert Panel wrote that 
Australians ‘are also increasingly aware that in one important respect the 
Constitution is incomplete. It remains silent in relation to the prior and 
continuing existence of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. An essential 
part of the national story is missing.’76 
                                                
68  Ibid. 
69  Ibid 12. 
70  Ibid 13. 
71  Ibid. 
72  Balkin, above n 2, 61. 
73  Expert Panel, above n 1, v. 
74  Ibid 11. 
75  Ibid xvii. 
76  Ibid 42. 
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A failed referendum could only result in confusion about the nation’s sense 
of national identity if the Australian Constitution serves as some sort of locus for 
national identity. The whole idea that amending the Australian Constitution 
would supply an essential, but currently missing, part of Australia’s national 
story is based on a view of the Australian Constitution serving as some sort of 
locus for national identity, as, of course, is the view that notions of national 
stories are at all relevant to a constitution. Indeed, the minutes of the Expert 
Panel’s second meeting record a member of the Expert Panel saying ‘[t]here is a 
possibility for a narrative that really tells Australians [who] they are.’77 The 
Expert Panel is clear that the Australian Constitution has, or has the potential to 
have, an ‘our law’ function. The Expert Panel wrote that a professional analysis 
of written submissions showed that one of the most frequently offered reasons in 
favour of constitutional recognition was that ‘constitutional recognition will more 
accurately reflect Australia’s history and national identity.’78 In other words, in 
its own thinking and in the thinking conveyed to it, the Expert Panel understood 
that its work was very much concerned with national identity. Such an 
understanding is even reflected in the name of the Expert Panel’s website: 
www.youmeunity.org.au. 
 
2 The Expert Panel’s Proposals and the Australian Constitution as Our Law 
Given the Expert Panel viewed its task partly in our law terms, it is 
unsurprising that its recommendations reflect our law thinking. Indeed, in one of 
its proposals the Expert Panel even uses the word ‘our’. 
As noted above, proposed section 127A is not considered by the Expert Panel 
as having any legal effect nor any ‘basic law’ function. As well as its ‘higher 
law’ function explained above, it also seems to have an intended our law 
function. The Expert Panel wrote in reference to this provision ‘[s]pecifically, the 
Panel has concluded that recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
languages as part of our national heritage gives appropriate recognition to the 
significance of those languages.’79 
The provision is described by the Expert Panel as ‘an important declaratory 
statement’80 in relation to the importance of those languages. The provision 
declares something about Australia’s national identity. The Expert Panel wrote in 
its report of the importance of language to identity.81 In this regard, it quoted a 
participant at one of its community consultation meetings: ‘recognition of 
different languages and cultures is very important because that’s your identity.’82  
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Proposed section 127A is very much an identity provision. The first sentence 
of proposed section 127A that states English is the ‘national language’ of 
Australia. The Expert Panel writes that that sentence ‘simply acknowledges the 
existing and undisputed position.’83 This is an important aspect of Australia’s 
identity: it is an English speaking country. The second sentence of the provision 
is perhaps most explicit in revealing the ‘our law’ thinking at play. That sentence 
states: ‘The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages are the original 
Australian languages, a part of our national heritage.’84 There are a number of 
features of this sentence beyond simply its recognition of languages revealing an 
identity function. The first of these features is describing Indigenous languages as 
Australian. In doing so, the Expert Panel has put an identity label on those 
languages. That label may well be obvious and uncontroversial, but the proposed 
constitutional text is serving an explicit identity function nonetheless. A second 
feature is the use of the concept ‘national heritage’. That concept is not explained 
in the Expert Panel’s Report and its precise meaning is not immediately obvious. 
But national heritage is, at a general level, a concept referring to features from a 
nation’s past that are thought worthy of being carried on through the present to 
the future; to adopt Balkin’s words, it ‘helps connect past to present’.85 National 
heritage is part of what is common to the past, present and future of Australian 
identity.  
Perhaps the most telling feature of the second sentence of proposed section 
127A revealing its intended identity function is the use of the word ‘our’. For 
present purposes it can be overlooked that the use of the word ‘our’ is a technical 
defect in the proposal since the rest of the Australian Constitution is written in 
the third person. What is relevant here is that the proposed constitutional text is 
intended as speaking not only to but also with the Australian people, all of the 
Australian people regardless of their backgrounds. The second sentence of 
proposed section 127A, the Expert Panel explains, declares the significance of 
those languages ‘especially for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, 
but for all other Australians as well.’86 They are part of our national heritage, part 
of our identity. Proposed section 127A is very plainly intended by the Expert 
Panel to have an important ‘our law’ function. It declares important features of 
Australia’s national identity. 
Proposed section 51A also appears to be intended as serving an ‘our law’ 
function. The ‘statement of recognition’ aspect to the preambular recitals to 
proposed section 51A is seen by the Expert Panel as having an identity function. 
This is particularly so in relation to the third recital: ‘Respecting the continuing 
cultures, languages and heritage of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples’. The Expert Panel wrote in respect of this recital that ‘[n]umerous 
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submissions suggested that recognition of culture and languages would be a 
unifying experience for the nation.’87 The whole purpose is bringing Australians 
together, allowing them to imagine themselves as one unified people despite any 
racial, ethnic or other differences. To quote Balkin, ‘it binds together people… as 
a single people’.88 The Expert Panel also considered that adopting this recital 
‘would declare an important truth in Australian history’.89 A nation’s history is, 
of course, important in constructing national identity.  
The heading to proposed section 51A also reveals the provision’s our law 
function. The legal substance of the provision would suggest that an accurate 
heading to the section would be something like ‘[p]ower to legislate in respect of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.’ Yet the heading proposed by the 
Expert Panel does not refer to the legal substance of the provision at all. The 
Expert Panel’s proposed heading to the provision is ‘Recognition of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples.’ The Expert Panel’s Report does not offer any 
explicit explanation for its choice of language for the heading. The Expert Panel 
did, however, emphasise in its report that a statement of recognition of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples would contribute to a more unified 
and reconciled nation.90 Given the Expert Panel’s thinking about what its task 
generally was and what a statement of recognition is intended to achieve, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the heading to the provision emphasises recognition, a 
matter obviously connected to notions of inclusion and thus identity, rather than 
legal (basic law) substance.  
Whilst the heading to proposed section 116A ‘Prohibition of racial 
discrimination’ does refer to the legal substance of the provision, the provision 
nonetheless has an important ‘our law’ function. This provision’s moral or 
‘higher law’ function, as discussed above, in ‘affirming that racially 
discriminatory laws and executive actions have no place in contemporary 
Australia’91 is closely related to its our law function.92 The Expert Panel wrote 
that the provision would ‘contribute to a more unified and reconciled nation’ and 
‘remove race as a criterion for discrimination by legislative or executive action in 
all Australian jurisdictions.’93 So, proposed section 116A not only assists in 
binding the Australian people together as a people but also ensures that they 
cannot by legislative or executive action be unbound on the basis of race. In other 
words, this provision would entrench that race is not a criterion for Australian 
identity.  
There is also ‘our law’ thinking involved in the Expert Panel’s proposals to 
delete section 25 and the races power from the Australian Constitution. Those 
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deletions are a ‘necessary complement’94 to the other proposals put forward by 
the Expert Panel. It would be somewhat less than coherent to adopt the other 
provisions proposed by the Expert Panel that are intended to make race irrelevant 
to Australian identity whilst retaining provisions that expressly contemplates 
(adverse) discrimination on the basis of race. 
 
IV    CLAIM TWO: THE EXPERT PANEL BELIEVES THE 
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION CAN BE MADE MORE 
LEGITIMATE 
A    The Australian Constitution Is Not Higher Law or Our Law 
A preliminary step in showing that the Expert Panel is critiquing the 
legitimacy of the Australian Constitution and suggesting that it can be made 
more legitimate is to refute the idea that the Australian Constitution currently 
functions as higher law and our law. 
The notion that the Australian Constitution functions as higher law,  
in Balkin’s sense, does not sit comfortably with Australian political and  
legal reality. During a symposium on Living Originalism, the contributions  
to which were later published, Jeffrey Goldsworthy stated bluntly that ‘The 
Australian Constitution is a basic but not a higher law’.95 Goldsworthy explained 
‘[c]onsisting almost entirely of structural and power-conferring provisions, [the 
Australian Constitution] lacks the grand and inspirational declarations of national 
values or principles that are found in a “higher law”.’96 
True though this description may be, the plain text of a constitution is not 
necessarily determinative of whether a constitution functions as higher law. 
Much of the United States Constitution consists of structural and power-
conferring provisions, and some of the provisions of its Bill of Rights have 
analogues in the Australian Constitution.97 What appears in Balkin’s analysis to 
be of much greater importance in determining whether a constitution functions as 
higher law is the way in which ordinary people look to it as a repository of values 
and aspirations. Indeed, the United States Constitution almost certainly did not 
become higher law until some time after its ratification. As one American 
constitutional scholar has written, ‘After ratification, most Americans promptly 
forgot about the first ten amendments [ie, the Bill of Rights] to the 
Constitution.’98 
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Balkin explains that, in its higher law function, ‘Americans view their 
Constitution as a source of important values’.99 Most ordinary Americans, one 
might fairly assume, have only a cursory familiarity with the substance of the 
United States Constitution. Indeed, many Americans (including legal scholars) 
make contradictory claims about the substance of that document, a point Balkin 
acknowledges and explains as a feature of his theory of constitutionalism.100 The 
legal truth of such claims is irrelevant to the United States Constitution’s function 
as higher law. As explained above, political movements make claims in the name 
of the constitution to critique the status quo and advocate for change. It does not 
matter whether values and aspirations are stated in the text of a constitution or are 
read in or imagined. A constitution functions as higher law when people look to 
it as embodying important values and aspirations and those values and 
aspirations are used to critique the status quo and advocate for change. 
It is difficult to find many examples in Australian history of social 
movements making political claims in the name of the Australian Constitution or 
in the name of values or aspirations supposed to be embodied in it. As 
Goldsworthy explained: 
In Australia, public commitment to and debate over principles of political morality 
are largely left to the political realm. Historically, social movements have rarely 
appealed to values they supposed to be embedded in the Constitution, except for 
those inspired by the structural principle of “states’ rights.” For the most part, the 
Constitution merely provides a framework within which debates over political 
morality take place, and only lawyers appeal to constitutional principles.101 
This analysis should be uncontroversial. The Australian Constitution does not 
function as higher law in the same sense that the United States Constitution does. 
As Balkin acknowledges in his response to Goldsworthy: 
Many constitutions may not serve as higher law in the same way that America’s 
Constitution does; the idea of political aspiration may come from different 
features of a political culture and its history. People in other countries may not 
point to their constitutions as the symbol or embodiment of their political ideals 
and aspirations.102 
Indeed, the Expert Panel commissioned qualitative research, which was 
conducted in 2011, that indicated Australians do not look to the Australian 
Constitution as a repository of values or ideals. That research found: 
Focus group participants were aware that Australia has a written constitution. 
However, most said they did not know much about the Constitution … some felt 
they knew more about the American Constitution than they did about their own … 
Those who knew something about it believe that the Australian Constitution is 
primarily a description of, or formula for, federalism; that is, the respective roles 
of the states and the Federal Government, and not a statement of beliefs or ideals. 
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Respondents believed it to be different in tone and content from the American 
Constitution …103 
It is also the case that the Australian Constitution does not function as our 
law. At the symposium mentioned above, Goldsworthy also described the idea 
that the Australian Constitution functions as our law as ‘dubious because, in 
1992, no less than one-third of Australians were found not to know that they even 
had a written constitution, let alone anything about its contents.’104 If there is a 
widespread lack of awareness of the existence of a constitution or, as the 2011 
research noted above suggests, any perceived awareness of a constitution’s 
contents, that document can hardly be taken to serve as any sort of locus of 
national identity. 
What is most interesting about Goldsworthy’s explanation of why the 
Australian Constitution is not our law is that the Expert Panel seems to entirely 
agree. In its report, the Expert Panel wrote: 
Qualitative research conducted for the Panel in August 2011 by Newspoll and a 
separate study by Reconciliation Australia found there is little knowledge among 
Australian voters of the Constitution's role and importance, or about the processes 
involved in moving towards and achieving success at a referendum. A 1987 
survey for the Constitutional Commission found that 47 per cent of Australians 
were unaware that Australia has a written constitution. The 1994 report of the 
Civics Expert Group, Whereas the People ... Civics and Citizenship Education, 
found that only one in five people had some understanding of what the 
Constitution contains. 
Consultations and submissions confirmed this widespread lack of education on 
and awareness of the Constitution among Australians.105 
The Expert Panel also wrote in its report that its consultations ‘revealed 
limited understanding among Australians of our constitutional history’.106 In other 
words, the Expert Panel acknowledges a lack of knowledge of the Australian 
Constitution on the part of Australians. 
If, as the Expert Panel explains, Australians do not understand the what ‘the 
Constitution contains’ or its ‘role’ and ‘importance’, Goldsworthy must be right 
when he says that: 
Australians, on the other hand [ie, compared to Americans], seem perfectly able to 
identity themselves as a historically continuing people, characterized by some 
basic shared values and commitments, without their Constitution playing a large 
part in the narrative, except as the essential legal device by which Federation was 
attained. The common values and commitments that define them as a people can 
be left unwritten – the Constitution can take them for granted, and vice versa – 
while serving the functions that Balkin emphasizes (providing a collective 
narrative, binding different generations together, and so on).107 
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B    The Expert Panel and Constitutional Legitimacy 
In engaging in ‘higher law’ and ‘our law’ thinking, the Expert Panel has 
offered an interesting critique of the legitimacy of the Australian Constitution. 
In Living Originalism, Balkin argues that a constitution’s functions as basic 
law, higher law and our law serve to give a constitution democratic legitimacy. 
Balkin argues that each of these functions contributes to a constitution’s 
democratic legitimacy in different, albeit related, ways. 108  The ‘basic law’ 
function of a constitution gives it procedural legitimacy, the ‘higher law’ function 
moral legitimacy and the ‘our function’ sociological legitimacy.109 
Balkin explains that a constitution is procedurally legitimate ‘to the extent 
that people clothed with state power (which might include government officials, 
jurors and voters) make decisions according to official legal rules and 
procedures.’110 This is essentially a ‘thin’ version of the rule of law. It is legalism, 
and indeed Balkin puts the words ‘or legally’ after the word ‘procedurally’ in his 
explanation of this form of legitimacy: ‘It is procedurally (or legally) legitimate 
to the extent that…’111 Balkin explains that if a constitution fails to succeed as 
basic law it will not be procedurally legitimate.112 It should be uncontroversial 
that the Australian Constitution is procedurally legitimate in this sense and that it 
succeeds as basic law. It does in fact establish and provide the legal framework 
for governance in Australia. The Expert Panel accepts that the Australian 
Constitution is procedurally legitimate. 
Where the Expert Panel’s critique of the Australian Constitution is apparent 
is in terms of moral and sociological legitimacy. Balkin explains that a 
constitution is morally legitimate ‘to the extent that the system is just or morally 
admirable.’113 The Expert Panel is quite plain that the Australian Constitution has 
multiple failings in this regard. It expressly contemplates racially discriminatory 
laws and expressly contemplates race-based exclusion from voting. The Expert 
Panel explained that this is a source of embarrassment for many Australians114 
and a blemish on Australia’s nationhood.115 This is not just or morally admirable. 
It fails to acknowledge the history and cultures of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples. It is ‘silent’116 in regard to an important part of Australia and 
fails to declare ‘an important truth’.117 This too is not just or morally admirable. 
The third type of legitimacy essential to democratic legitimacy, Balkin 
argues, is sociological legitimacy. A constitution is sociologically legitimate, 
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Balkin explains, ‘to the extent that people accept the system as having the right 
and the authority to rule them.’118 A constitution’s success as our law in reflecting 
and being responsive to a people’s needs, ideals and values, Balkin writes, 
promotes sociological legitimacy. 119  In important respects, the Expert Panel 
believes that the Australian Constitution has flaws in its sociological legitimacy. 
For the Expert Panel there is a sense in which the Australian Constitution does 
not belong to Indigenous Australians in the way it does for non-Indigenous 
Australians. The Expert Panel’s Report quotes an unnamed participant in a 
community consultation meeting saying ‘We [Indigenous people] should be in 
the Constitution’.120 There is a clear theme throughout the Report that Indigenous 
Australians are excluded from the Australian Constitution. The Expert Panel 
wrote of the need ‘for moving on from the history of constitutional non-
recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’121 and seizing a 
‘historic opportunity to recognise Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
as the first peoples of Australia, to affirm their full and equal citizenship, and to 
remove the last vestiges of racial discrimination from the Constitution.’ 122 
Without taking this step, the Australian Constitution will ‘in one important 
respect’123 remain ‘incomplete.’124  
It is important to emphasise that the suggestion here is not that the Expert 
Panel believes the Australian Constitution to be illegitimate. The suggestion is 
not that the Expert Panel believes the Australian Constitution to be morally 
illegitimate or sociologically illegitimate, in the senses explained by Balkin. 
Rather, the suggestion is that the Expert Panel believes that the Australian 
Constitution can be made more legitimate – it can be made more morally 
legitimate and more sociologically legitimate – by adopting the proposed 
amendments.  
This is entirely consistent with how Balkin understands constitutional 
legitimacy. In Living Originalism, Balkin writes ‘[l]egitimate is also a relative 
term, a bit like the word tall. A system is more or less legitimate, although at 
some point we would say that the system is illegitimate.’125 Adopting the Expert 
Panel’s proposals will help the Australian Constitution succeed as higher law and 
as our law and enhance its moral and sociological legitimacy. The parts of the 
Australian Constitution that are not just and morally admirable can be fixed. 
Adopting the Expert Panel’s recommendations will make the Australian 
Constitution overall more just and morally admirable. The exclusion of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people that the Expert Panel believes to be 
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inherent in the body of the Australian Constitution can be transformed into 
inclusion by adopting the Expert Panel’s recommendations. This inclusion will 
enhance the Australian Constitution’s sociological legitimacy because ‘changing 
the Constitution will contribute to a sense of belonging … for so many 
Indigenous people’.126 So, in other words, the Expert Panel has in its Report 
offered a critique of the legitimacy of the Australian Constitution and in its 
proposals for constitutional amendment a way to make it more legitimate.  
Whatever the merits of this critique, if the Australian Constitution is not 
higher law or our law, then it may not be immediately obvious why should it 
matter if the Australian Constitution has failings in terms of moral and 
sociological legitimacy. The critique matters because it is a preliminary step in a 
much larger and more profound project in which the Expert Panel is engaged. 
That project is one of constitutional redemption, which is the third claim made in 
this article. 
 
V    CLAIM THREE: THE EXPERT PANEL IS ENGAGED IN A 
PROJECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 
A    The Expert Panel and Constitutional Redemption 
In seeking to have the Australian Constitution function, at least in some way, 
as higher law and as our law and to thereby enhance its moral and sociological 
legitimacy, the Expert Panel has bought into another of Balkin’s ideas: 
constitutional redemption. 
 
1 Constitutional Redemption  
In Living Originalism, Balkin distinguishes between what he calls  
the ‘Constitution-in-practice’ and the ‘Constitution’. The ‘Constitution’ is the 
document whereas the ‘Constitution-in-practice’ is the constitutional text ‘plus 
the constructions, institutions, understandings, and practices that have grown up 
around it’.127 Balkin gives two reasons why it is important to distinguish between 
the Constitution and the Constitution-in-practice. The first is that it is necessary 
to distinguish between the way a constitution has been implemented and  
the various ways it could be implemented. The Constitution-in-practice  
‘includes statutory frameworks, judicial glosses, traditions of practice, cultural 
understandings, and political institutions.’128 It is a particular implementation of 
the Constitution’s plan for politics. The Constitution-in-practice, therefore, can 
change over time even if there is no amendment to the constitutional text.129 The 
second reason Balkin gives is this: 
                                                
126  Expert Panel, above n 1, 67 quoting an unnamed participant at a public consultation. 
127  Balkin, above n 2, 69. 
128  Ibid. 
129  Ibid. 
428 UNSW Law Journal Volume 37(2) 
Second, viewed from the perspective of a particular person, the Constitution-in-
practice may be unjust and unfaithful to the best understanding of the 
Constitution. Hence it is useful to have a way of talking about the ‘true’ or ‘ideal’ 
Constitution that is distinct from the Constitution as a currently instantiated 
institution. When people critique the Constitution-in-practice in the name of the 
Constitution – or in the name of what the Constitution truly stands for – they 
implicitly make this distinction. They are advocating a restoration or a redemption 
of an ideal or true Constitution that may never have existed fully or completely in 
practice, but that they view as their goal.130 
In other words, it is necessary to distinguish between the two so that it is 
possible to understand redemptive constitutionalism. 
For Balkin, ‘[r]edemptive constitutionalism is the claim that our Constitution 
is always a work in progress – imperfect and compromised, but directed towards 
its eventual improvement.’131 More fully: 
The belief that the Constitution is a collective project of many generations, that it 
makes promises to the future that are only imperfectly realized in the present, that 
we should have faith that the Constitution will become better over time, and that 
we should work for the eventual redemption of its promises in history I call 
redemptive constitutionalism.132 
Constitutional redemption is not just an important part of Living Originalism. 
It is the focus of a companion work Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in 
an Unjust World.133 In order to explain what it seems the Expert Panel is doing it 
is only necessary to give a brief sketch of what is a very complex concept.  
Constitutional redemption is not the same thing as constitutional reform, 
although constitutional reform can be a part of constitutional redemption. Balkin 
explains:  
Redemption is not simply reform, but change that fulfils a promise of the past. 
Redemption does not mean discarding the existing Constitution and substituting a 
different one, but returning the Constitution we have to its correct path, pushing it 
closer to what we take to be its true nature, and discarding the dross of past moral 
compromise.134 
It is important to emphasise that constitutional redemption is an imaginative 
and creative process. It is not about redeeming what was always there. It is about 
redeeming what it is popularly imagined ought to have been there: 
Redemption does not conform our practices to a preestablished template. It does 
not realize a nature that was foreordained, like an acorn naturally turning into an 
oak. It is inevitably an exercise in imagination – envisioning what the Constitution 
always should have meant in an alien time for which it was not prepared.135 
Constitutional redemption is a narrative process and storytelling is central to 
its process. Indeed, Balkin speaks of a ‘national narrative of redemption.’136 But it 
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is not a descriptive narrative of the kind an historian might engage in. It is a 
storytelling that is ‘partial and incomplete.’137 It is less an attempt ‘at accurate 
description of the past than justification of the present and articulations of hopes 
for the future.’138 The storytelling device is important: 
Stories are more than simply true or false descriptions of the world, or simply sets 
of embedded values and agendas. They are also ways of making things true and 
false in practice. By having a story about the direction of the country, and 
believing in that story, people can help make the story true over time.139 
It is also essential to recognise that when Balkin speaks of constitutional 
redemption, the constitution to which he refers is not simply the Constitution as 
the constitutional text but the Constitution-in-practice.140 
 
2 The Expert Panel’s Project of Redemption 
The Expert Panel’s Report tells a story. It is a partial and selective story and 
its purpose is very plainly to articulate hope for the future. The aim, of course, is 
to make that story come true. 
It is necessary to begin by considering the content of the story being told. 
Chapter 1 of the Expert Panel’s Report is titled ‘Historical background’ and  
does the bulk of the story telling.141 The chapter does indeed deal with matters 
that can be fairly described as background to any referendum on constitutional 
recognition of Indigenous Australians. It discusses the drafting of the Australian 
Constitution and the purposes for which the races power, section 25 and the  
now repealed section 127 (excluding ‘aboriginal natives’ from being counted in 
reckoning the numbers of people of the Commonwealth and of the States) were 
included.142 It discusses the 1967 Referendum,143 which repealed section 127 and 
deleted the exclusion of Indigenous Australians from the races power. It 
discusses the interpretation of the races power following the 1967 Referendum.144 
The chapter also discusses matters that seem, at least from a constitution-as-
basic-law perspective, somewhat disconnected from the Australian Constitution. 
There is a section titled ‘Colonisation and Aboriginal resistance’.145 There is a 
section discussing the White Australia Policy.146 There is a section discussing 
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Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (‘Mabo’).147 There is a section discussing approaches 
to Indigenous policy issues since 1972.148 Under the heading ‘Closing the Gap’ 
there is a discussion of the disparities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians in terms of social and economic disadvantage.149 In the conclusion to 
the chapter, the Expert Panel writes:  
The Panel examined the history of the Australian Constitution and law and policy 
relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples since Federation in order 
to fully address its terms of reference. This chapter has detailed the most relevant 
aspects of that history, which have informed the Panel’s consideration of the 
substantive matters in this report.150 
The content of the narrative reveals a number of things. First, it reveals that 
the Expert Panel is interested in the Constitution-in-practice not just the 
constitutional text. This is how it makes sense for the Expert Panel to discuss the 
matters described above as somewhat disconnected from the Australian 
Constitution.  
The narrative also adopts a modified version of Balkin’s idea that in 
constitutional law there exists a canon and an anti-canon. Balkin writes: 
The constitutional canon tells us which cases and doctrines are salient, correct, and 
central to our understanding, and which are forgotten, incorrect, and peripheral. 
Constitutional law, unlike the academic study of literature, always has both a 
canon and an anti-canon, and the anti-canon may be just as important to 
professional judgments. It tells us what legal performances stand as examples of 
how not to do constitutional argument and constitutional law.151 
Whereas Balkin’s canon/anti-canon analysis is closely focused on 
constitutional law per se, the Expert Panel is somewhat looser in adopting 
Balkin’s analysis. It applies the notion more broadly to legal policy. For the 
Expert Panel, the White Australia Policy and the now repealed section 127, for 
example, are part of the Australian anti-canon. They are bad and not to be 
repeated. Mabo and the 1967 Referendum are part of the canon. They are good 
and should be embraced.  
Indeed, the 1967 Referendum appears for the Expert Panel to be so self-
evidently good it can be the subject of discussion without its nature first being 
explained. In the Report’s introductory chapter, which precedes the chapter on 
the historical background, is a heading ‘A historic opportunity’. The first 
paragraph under that heading reads: 
The 1967 referendum was held 45 years ago. Current multiparty support has 
created a historic opportunity to recognise Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples as the first peoples of Australia, to affirm their full and equal citizenships, 
and to remove the last vestiges of racial discrimination from the Constitution.152 
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The first sentence seems rather disconnected from the second. That first 
sentence is itself odd. Nowhere in the chapter is there an explanation of what the 
1967 Referendum was about. This is not just bad drafting. It is evidence of how 
important the 1967 Referendum is in the Expert Panel’s view. It is so much part 
of the canon of what is good in constitutional law and legal policy regarding 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians that it does not need an 
explanation and its symbolism can be invoked to add weight to other claims.153 
The third thing the content of the Expert Panel’s narrative reveals is a belief 
in the possibility of constitutional redemption in Australia. This is apparent from 
the Expert Panel’s adoption of the canon/anti-canon analysis in the historical 
chapter of its Report. It is also apparent from the importance with which the 
Expert Panel views the 1967 Referendum. In this regard, it quoted this analysis 
of the effect of the 1967 Referendum offered by Indigenous leader Noel Pearson: 
The original Constitution of 1901 established a negative citizenship of the 
country's original peoples. The reforms undertaken in 1967, which resulted in the 
counting of Indigenous Australians in the national census and the extension of the 
races power to Indigenous Australians, can be viewed as providing a neutral 
citizenship for the original Australians. What is still needed is a positive 
recognition of our status as the country's Indigenous peoples, and yet sharing a 
common citizenship with all other Australians.154 
The 1967 Referendum represented important progress, but the promise of 
that progress is not yet fully realised. Further constitutional amendment is 
necessary. 
For Balkin, constitutional redemption is a process that occurs most often by 
means other than by formal constitutional amendment, but it can involve 
constitutional amendment. As Balkin explains, one of the ways in which people 
can change the Constitution-in-practice is by working to amend the Constitution 
through the procedure it provides for this process; in Australia’s case by the 
section 128 referendum mechanism. The 13th Amendment, abolishing slavery, 
and the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment, allowing black citizenship, are 
American examples Balkin gives of this.155 This is precisely what the Expert 
Panel is doing. The Expert Panel is working not simply to amend the Australian 
Constitution’s text, it is also working to improve the Australian Constitution-in-
practice. It is therefore engaged in redemptive constitutionalism. The result  
of constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples  
will be a more ready basis on which to make claims the name of the  
Australian Constitution to remedy injustice, a core feature of redemptive 
constitutionalism.156 
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It is also important to recognise that Balkin’s constitutional redemption is 
never achieved. The point is never reached where it can be said the Constitution 
is redeemed: ‘The Constitution, and therefore the Constitution-in-practice, 
always exists in a fallen condition … It is an unfinished building, and perpetually 
in need of repair and renovation.’157 Likewise, the Expert Panel does not suggest 
that its proposals amount to complete redemption. Its report speaks of ‘this round 
of reform’158 indicating that more than what it recommends may be necessary for 
redemption. Balkin’s description of constitutional redemption as an ongoing task 
is reflected in the foreword to the Expert Panel’s report which tells a story of the 
constitutional redemption achieved so far in Australia’s history and what should 
come next: 
The consultations the Panel undertook were a reminder of how far Australia has 
come since the nation's legal and political foundations were laid down in the late 
nineteenth century. Then, in line with the values of the times, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples were excluded from the deliberations that led to the 
adoption of the Constitution. The text of the Constitution excluded them. It was 
not until two-thirds of the way through the nation's first century that the exclusion 
was removed and the Constitution shifted closer to a position of neutrality. The 
logical next step is to achieve full inclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples in the Constitution by recognising their continuing cultures, 
languages and heritage as an important part of our nation and by removing the 
outdated notion of race.159 
Noting ‘how far Australia has come’ is a statement that some redemption has 
occurred. The proposals presented in the Expert Panel’s report are ‘the logical 
next step … to achieve full inclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples in the Constitution’.160 But the Expert Panel never suggests that the task 
of constitutional redemption would be completed in taking that step. That step 
achieves one goal and possibly paves the way for the achievement of others. The 
Expert Panel is alive to the potential that further redemption may be possible.  
 
VI    CONCLUSION: IT’S THE VIBE OF THE THING 
The thesis of this article is that Balkinian constitutionalism pervades the 
Expert Panel’s analysis and its recommendations. The Expert Panel’s report is 
not, however, the first attempt to view the Australian Constitution as higher law 
and as our law. It is not the first attempt to critique the Australian Constitution-
in-practice and demand constitutional redemption. Indeed, there is a High  
Court case on the subject, but it is not a case reported in the Commonwealth  
Law Reports. It is the case of Kerrigan v Commonwealth. In concluding his  
oral submissions before the High Court that the constitutional prohibition  
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against acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms161 prevented the 
Commonwealth from acquiring Darryl Kerrigan’s home, the hapless suburban 
lawyer Dennis Denuto said ‘[i]n summing up, it’s the Constitution, it’s Mabo, it’s 
justice, it’s law, it’s the vibe.’162 
The reference to The Castle163 is not intended to mock either the Expert Panel 
or Balkin’s analysis. Indeed, Balkin would likely welcome the reference as it 
serves to emphasise his point that it is ordinary people who look to the Australian 
Constitution as higher law and our law and who make the Australian Constitution 
higher law and our law. There really does appear to be an element of ‘it’s the 
vibe’164 to the notion of a constitution as higher law and our law. The vibe is not 
real, of course. And nor, in one sense, really is the United States Constitution’s 
function as higher law or our law. There is nothing about the text of the United 
States Constitution, or any constitution for that matter, that necessitates its 
functioning as higher law or our law. As Balkin shows in Living Originalism, the 
United States Constitution certainly does function as higher law and our law, but 
only because, as discussed above, Americans look to it as higher law and our 
law. Ordinary people made it higher law and our law and ordinary people 
continue it as higher law and our law. They need not, but they do. 
The reference to The Castle and the vibe is intended to draw attention to the 
fact that it is possible for Australians to think in such terms too. It is such thought 
that creates a constitution as higher law and our law and opens the possibility to a 
politics of constitutional redemption in Balkin’s sense. Perhaps Dennis Denuto is 
on the same page as the Expert Panel: Mabo is part of the constitutional canon. 
Its name can be invoked to lend moral credence to other political projects. 
Perhaps the Australian Constitution might one day be higher law. Perhaps one 
day the Australian Constitution might be our law. Perhaps the Expert Panel is 
seeking, whether consciously or not, to take a step in that direction. It certainly 
looks like it.  
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